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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
While firms increasingly rely on mergers and acquisitions as a 
key growth instrument, many firms have difficulty successfully 
integrating the target. To counter the disappointing statistics, 
some firms like IBM and Xerox use M&A practices that capture 
learnings to improve M&A integrations. Comparing occasional with 
master acquirers, we find that those that make effective use of 
such M&A practices increase their chances of success with up to 
24%. While there are plenty of reasons for M&A integrations to 
fail, we derive four key lessons that give master acquirers a 
leading edge over their occasional counterparts. The findings are 
based on survey data by 101 firms engaged in 2,447 integrations 
over the past decade and one dozen expert interviews. The 
conclusions are based using case examples of master M&A 
integration practices from six master acquirers IBM, Xerox, Home 
Depot, Dow Chemical, GE Capital Finance and SC Johnson. 
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on this topic. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
When it comes to mergers and acquisitions, CEOs would like to 
believe that the following scenario will also come true for their 
impending deals: 
   
“When Xerox announced that it would acquire Tektronix, its share 
price hardly moved either on the day or during the entire first 
week.  However, one year later, a study revealed that the smooth 
and successful integration of Tektronix added $1 billion in 
market capitalization.  Xerox also gained a strong market share 
position (number 2) in color engines and print controllers, both 
of which are now found in many of Xerox’s core products.  
Finally, a number of Tektronix senior executives moved up into 
senior leadership positions within the corporation.” 
 
Regrettably, one figure that has persisted over time is the high 
failure rate of M&A integrations.  While M&A profitability is 
measured differently across the numerous studies, research shows 
that as little as 20% of all integrations truly create 
shareholder value.  Examples of disastrous integrations abound 
such as those following the AOL and Time Warner integration in 
2001.  Hence, firms struggle to reap the benefits of the costly 
integrations they pursue.  Still, it does not stop many to 
continue to spread the urge to merge.  Although the number of 
newly announced integrations slightly decreased during the 
beginning of the decennium, it has increased substantially again 
in many sectors since 2003.   
 
Some companies have much more experience with M&A than others.  
Recent McKinsey research revealed that as much as 84% of the 
deals are done by only 19 of the Fortune 500 companies. Such 
master acquirers benefit from the accumulated experience they 
have built up which can be important to be successful in 
subsequent deals. Yet our insights suggest that it is not 
experience alone that counts. Rather we find is it the investment 
in post-integration learning that drives superior M&A integration 
performance. Master acquirers not only repeatedly rely on 
acquisitions as a way to grow, but also prove very dedicated to 
codify knowledge arising from previous acquisitions to build M&A 
integration capabilities.   
 
We investigated how the master acquirers have built their M&A 
capabilities. Using survey data provided by 101 firms that were 
engaged in 2,447 integrations over the past decade, we compare 
the frequency of use and effectiveness of four categories of M&A 
integration practices for master versus occasional acquirers. 
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Using rich material from in-depth interviews, four key lessons 
from IBM, Home Depot, Dow Chemical, and Xerox are used to 
demonstrate how these firms use M&A practices and raise their M&A 
integration performance by up to 24%. 
 
 
*** Insert Sidebar 1 about here *** 
 
 
PRACTICES UNDERLYING M&A CAPABILITIES 
 
While for most companies mergers and acquisitions are onetime 
events, there are some firms that are very committed to improve 
their acquisition integration process.   These firms are 
deliberately documenting and sharing their prior experiences.  
There is an evident interest in understanding how such firms 
master M&A integration. 
 
Using the results from the 101 companies, we found that they use 
four different groups of practices that help build M&A 
integration capabilities: 1) internal and external functions and 
staffing, 2) quantitative models, 3) tools and 4) documents and 
manuals (see Table 1 “Description of Categories of M&A 
Practices”).   
 
 
*** Insert Table 1 about here *** 
 
 
The frequency with which companies are using specific M&A 
integration practices differs widely, from 93 percent claiming to 
use a financial evaluation model to 47 percent noting that they 
carry out M&A integration training, (see Table 2 “Use of M&A 
Integration Practices” and Appendix “Description of M&A 
Practices”).   
 
 
*** Insert Table 2 about here *** 
 
 
The most frequently used practices are also those that are 
involved in the earliest and most quantitative phases of the M&A 
process (due diligence checklist, financial evaluation models, 
and outside lawyers and financial experts). While not all of the 
23 M&A practices are used by all of our respondents (e.g. 
integration management training is not used by a majority of 
respondents), master acquirers without exception make extensive 
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use of practices to support their integrations.  
 
An interesting example is General Electric Commercial Finance. 
This branch provides worldwide financial services and has 
acquired over 130 companies over the past ten years.  While the 
length of the integration processes may vary, GECF’s experience 
with M&A integration allows it to strictly adhere to each 
acquisition’s set timetable. In order to leverage its 
experiences, it has used a predefined set of M&A integration 
performance metrics.  Moreover, it uses a number of tools to 
mitigate the risks posed by cultural and management differences. 
For instance, an HR integration manual is used to address 
critical questions during the integration process about employees 
and company cultures. In 2004, GECF created an online ‘deal room’ 
where key learning from its M&A integrations are discussed. 
Subsequently, these lessons are documented and referenced for 
access on the firm’s intranet. The deal room is also used by 
integration teams to discuss integration issues during 
interactive meetings. 
 
 
WHY M&A PRACTICES MATTER 
 
The use of M&A practices has three main advantages: they help 
employees share prior experiences, foster transparency in the 
integration process, and build commitment towards integration 
success. 
 
Sharing prior experiences.  By sharing and documenting 
experience, employees can learn from each other.  Organized “de-
briefing” sessions with all the relevant participants in an 
acquisition allows for a learning feedback loop.  What worked 
well is highlighted and what needs to improve and how can become 
part of the initial M&A due diligence procedures. At Dow 
Chemical, the M&A Expertise Center facilitates this feedback loop 
since the M&A integration team takes the lead not only during the 
due diligence phase but also during implementation. Moreover, 
knowledge gained from the due diligence process can be best used 
during the integration if the M&A integration team leads it. 
 
Fostering transparency in integration process.  Formalizing M&A 
integration practices can render an overwhelming process more 
transparent.   One of the means to meet the inevitable political 
concerns during a merger or acquisition is to communicate 
endlessly what are the clear objectives and processes.  Having 
clear practices improves communication.  At IBM, a highly-
developed system of performance measures not only pilots the 
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integration process better, but also focuses everyone’s attention 
on value-creating activities. It creates a disciplined process to 
improve performance reporting to the CEO and CFO, which in turns 
encourages transparency. 
 
Building commitment towards integration process.  A well-oiled 
“integration engine” brings a certain dynamism that encourages 
commitment to the integration objectives and goals.  The initial 
phases – often confused and full of anxiety – are critical to 
winning commitment.  Especially for the target’s management and 
employees, the integration team’s professionalism, demonstrated 
through their experience and knowledge supported with documented 
procedures, can help reassure and engage them.   At Home Depot, 
roles and responsibilities are defined for each functional area 
in the integration process with a generic template, assigning 
timelines and toll-gates measurements, and creating an on-line 
integration playbook that can be flexibly applied to different 
lines of business.  All these efforts to standardize processes 
build commitment towards the integration process. 
 
 
 
 
COMPARING OCCASIONAL AND MASTER ACQUIRERS 
 
To understand what distinguishes occasional from master 
acquirers, we compared the firms who regarded M&As as a core 
growth instrument with those that did not. We discovered that 
master acquirers used not only a greater number of M&A practices 
(see Table 3 "Use of M&A Integration Practices Comparing Master 
and Occasional Acquirers"), but were also much more effective in 
using those M&A practices to be better in M&As (see Table 4 
"Effectiveness of M&A Practices Comparing Master and Occasional 
Acquirers"). 
 
 
*** Insert Table 3 about here *** 
 
 
*** Insert Table 4 about here *** 
 
 
So master acquirers not only report using M&A integration 
practices more often, they also report more effective use of 
these practices. Of the list of 23 items, occasional acquirers 
only make more often and more effectively use of external 
consultants. It seems intuitive that master acquirers with their 
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own internal M&A integration team would rely less on external 
consultants and find them less effective.  
 
Master acquirers outperform their less effective counterparts 
substantially: depending on the size of the acquisition they have 
a performance which is up to 24% higher. The performance 
differences differ depending on the size of the acquisition: as 
the size of the target grows larger, so the likelihood of failure 
rises, especially for acquirers with little experience or 
knowledge codification. Therefore, large deals (i.e. >US$ 1bn in 
sales) are more successfully managed (24% higher) by master 
acquirers than occasional acquirers.  The differential in success 
rate between master and occasional acquirers in smaller deals 
(i.e. <US$ 100m in sales) is lower (7% higher). On average, the 
odds of success in M&A integrations are 13% higher for master 
acquirers than for occasional acquirers. 
 
Depending on size of the acquisition, master acquirers do not 
just simply perform better because of their past experience, but 
because they are committed to making more effective use of their 
M&A practices. The next section illustrates how by distilling 
four lessons learned from five master acquirers. IBM, 
Caterpillar, Dow Chemical, Home Depot and Xerox explain how they 
implement and make effective use of their M&A integration 
practices. 
 
 
 
 
BUILDING M&A INTEGRATION: FOUR LESSONS FROM FIVE MASTER ACQUIRERS 
 
Lesson 1 Specific Performance Metrics Drive M&A Integration 
Success  
 
Mona Miyashita, Managing Director, IBM Corporate Development (M&A 
Integration), strongly believes that performance metrics are key 
to successful M&A integration.  In general, the process of 
setting up and validating meaningful metrics requires focus and a 
wide-ranging discussion about the strategic rationale for the 
acquisition.  Business case assumptions translate into value 
drivers which then form the basis for meaningful performance 
metrics (e.g., revenue, cost/expense synergies, new customers, 
etc.).  These performance metrics can be validated in due 
diligence to determine the risks associated with the business 
case.   
 
The integration team can organize so-called 'value driver work 
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stream teams' that are responsible for delivering the associated 
performance metrics (e.g. new sales opportunities with acquired 
company’s clients, retention of target company’s business 
partners, selling acquired company’s offerings through IBM sales 
channels, synergy cost and expense through the merger, etc.).  In 
addition, the leading indicators required to execute specific 
metrics can serve as “headlights” during the performance tracking 
process, providing early warnings and signs of future performance 
and permitting time for course corrections if necessary. 
 
One of the key lessons learned from IBM’s M&A integration 
experience involves broadening the role of functional work 
streams.  While it is important for functional integration 
experts (who are often “black belts” in their area of expertise) 
to manage the nuts-and-bolts integration tasks, it is equally 
critical that they concentrate their functional expertise on 
executing the value drivers for a specific acquisition.  Stretch 
performance metrics for functional work streams should be 
considered.  These measures can provide needed support for 
transformation and strategic goals (such as change management and 
cultural integration) and help meet more tactical milestones.   
 
The process of developing and monitoring performance metrics also 
allows future integrations to benefit from the wisdom acquired 
through previous M&As.  According to Miyashita, analyzing what 
could have been improved (and how) in previous acquisitions leads 
to earlier readiness for similar requirements and their related 
leading indicators.  Leading indicators, for example, often arise 
from insights gained from completed acquisition integrations.  
Designing leading indicators for the performance metrics helps 
prepare work streams to be ready for a fast start on “day one”. 
 
For Miyashita, the effective use of acquisition integration 
performance metrics is ultimately dependent on how well the 
acquisition performance process is aligned with company 
management systems.  At IBM, the CEO and CFO regularly evaluate 
every acquisition’s progress using a robust quarterly review 
process for eight quarters.  This visibility creates 
accountability and motivates managers to focus on meeting their 
commitments.  Another advantage of this process is the 
opportunity to make positive changes to IBM’s base processes.  
When performance metrics are used as an integral approach in the 
end-to-end acquisition process (from due diligence to reporting 
back to the CEO and CFO), they help improve focus, drive 
execution, and increase the chances of a successful integration. 
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Lesson 2  Standardizing M&A Integration Procedures   
 
Every year, Home Depot’s M&A group and relevant functions target 
a dollar amount for acquisitions to complete.  In 2005, these 
projections led the company to pursue 21 acquisitions.  Due to 
this level of M&A activity, the company has made documenting and 
standardizing processes for its many acquisitions a critical 
activity. 
 
John Hartmann, director, strategic business development, manages 
the process and execution of integrating acquisitions at Home 
Depot. Over the past two years, Hartmann’s role has expanded to 
include regulating the process of M&A integration, selecting and 
training business integrators, educating business leaders for M&A 
integration, and overseeing the quarterly integration review 
process. His group has also created an “e-room” that makes 
collaborative tools and templates available online to help pilot 
current integrations and prepare employees for future 
acquisitions. 
 
As part of their effort to institute standard processes, 
Hartmann’s group has also developed a generic integration 
template to collect information from each function. This data is 
then used to define the roles and responsibilities for each 
functional area (e.g., IT, human resources, legal, communication, 
risk management, finance, credit services, corporate compliance, 
government relations, public relations, and safety). All 
functions are then assigned timelines and “toll gate” 
measurements (i.e., approvals for each part of the process that 
are needed to advance to the next level of approval). These 
templates and “toll gate” measurements vary depending on Home 
Depot’s three lines of business - The Home Depot (Retail), HD 
Supply (Wholesale), and Services (Installation) - and the special 
characteristics of each acquisition. In addition to forming the 
basis for a playbook that functions as a detailed guide to the 
integration process, these tools can also be used in weekly phone 
calls to business and integration leaders and other functional 
specialists.  
 
Depending on its size, an acquisition may pass through three or 
four quarterly acquisition integration reviews that focus on 
exceptional items outside of the target metrics set for the 
acquisition plan. While financial metrics remain an important 
part of these meetings with the CEO and the CFO, additional 
measures have been created around functional integration 
activities (such as IT, human resources, safety, legal, etc.). 
Starting about a month prior to the quarterly review meeting, the 
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M&A integration team preps each business leader on how he or she 
should present progress for his or her part of a particular 
integration. Members of the team also act as fact-finders, 
determining what is not going well so that remedial action can be 
taken. 
 
 
Lesson 3  M&A Professionals Bundle and Disperse Best Practices 
 
Dow Chemical established the M&A Expertise Center (the Center) in 
2002 after its successful acquisition integration of Union 
Carbide in 2001.  Randy Croyle, director of the Center, believes 
his team can facilitate the implementation of a wide range of 
activities by managing the “white spaces” that every company has 
between its various businesses, geographies, and functions. The 
Center’s operational abilities allow it to manage time-critical 
elements that are just as useful for closing down a plant as they 
are for integrating a major acquisition.  
 
While ownership of an acquisition resides with the business 
division executive responsible for managing it, staff from the 
Center work with the lead executive to define the integration 
leader’s roles and responsibilities. After developing this 
profile, the two sides then collaborate to select the most 
appropriate person for the position of integration leader. Once 
such a leader is appointed, he or she works with Center staff to 
assemble implementation teams.  
 
The Center also assists the business leader in establishing 
overall objectives for the acquisition and determining the value 
drivers (e.g., headcount reduction, purchasing synergies, new 
product launches, etc.) behind the synergies that will justify 
its price. As a result, part of the Center’s role is to challenge 
business managers’ assumptions. This may mean pushing executives 
to make their synergy projections more realistic, or, on the 
other hand, advising leaders to move more quickly and make more 
aggressive projections. Center employees are active during the 
due diligence phase as well, ensuring that important information 
gathered over the course of that phase is not lost during 
implementation. 
 
The M&A Expertise Center integration team is now “swimming 
upstream” to incorporate their knowledge earlier in the process 
by supporting the deal negotiation teams.  Randy Croyle explains 
implementation issues to deal negotiators who may change their 
positioning or valuation of the target firm as a result.  
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Dow’s “After Action Review” process, which is patterned on the 
U.S. military’s, is an important part of building knowledge about 
how the company integrates its acquisitions. The first step in 
any such review is establishing its scope (e.g., whether it 
should it focus only on due diligence or also zero in on the 
sales or marketing aspects of the integration). As soon as this 
focus is set, an open-ended survey is sent to key individuals 
involved in the acquisition integration, and one-on-one 
interviews are conducted to hear the unvarnished analyses of what 
worked well and what did not. Key knowledge points gleaned from 
this process are summarized and incorporated into M&A integration 
procedures for use next time. In one acquisition, for example, 
the approach to lowering costs was to reduce personnel across all 
functional areas in the target company. An analysis of the 
results of the after action review, however, showed that it would 
have been better to reduce customer-facing personnel more slowly 
than back-office personnel. 
 
The archive of lessons learned continues to grow and provides 
examples for specific activities such as customer service, 
purchasing, or engineering.  Information from the archive has 
been used to create over 100 templates to help pilot the 
integration process.  The Center integration team also strives to 
incorporate the knowledge they have gained into the process in 
other ways.  By explaining implementation issues to deal 
negotiators early in the process, Croyle can help them determine 
whether they need to alter their positioning or their valuation 
of the target firm. 
 
 
Lesson 4 Piloting an Integration with Management Tools and 
Metrics 
 
John Vester, then Vice President of Strategy and Business 
Development, Xerox developed nine M&A integration management 
tools to pilot the integration of Tektronix.  Certain tools, such 
as those for readiness preparation, closing work plan, monitoring 
employee website comment board, were only used by the integration 
team members.  As the integration got underway, more of the tools 
facilitated synergy tracking, senior management work plans, 
briefings, and reporting to executives on the overall status of 
the integration.   
 
Readiness preparation and a closing working plan, the first 
management tools, were instrumental in creating the decision log, 
which was critical to managing a successful integration.  
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Discipline in integration management arises from putting 
decisions within appropriate parameters.  For the Tektronix 
integration, these included: 
• Decision number (prioritized by deadline date) 
• Decision description 
• Closing date requirement (yes/no) 
• Function 
• Areas impacted 
• Geographies impacted 
• Dependencies 
• Date decision needed 
• Priority (A, B, C ranking) 
• Value measure 
• Date first identified 
• Days open 
• Who’s working 
• Status 
• Actions already taken 
• Implications if unresolved 
 
By tracking all decisions, including those that were behind 
schedule, integration managers could see whether decision makers 
were moving fast enough and, if not, use the results to influence 
the pace of the process.  The log also helped the integration 
manager identify the consequence of not making a decision on 
time.   
 
Since no single tool was good for everything, the acquisition 
process required a variety of approaches.  In his experience, 
John Vester has found that a management tool performs well for 
about three months.  He also emphasized that the 80/20 rule 
prevailed throughout (i.e., it was better to focus energy and 
time on the big decisions with 80 percent impact than on issues 
with smaller impact) and that he made sure that tracking tools 
and metrics interacted at least at the level of information.  
Discipline in integration management arose from creating a 
critical decision log and focusing on the issues with highest 
impact. 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
Master acquirers distill their experience into knowledge that can 
be reused for future acquisitions.  The four lesson from five 
masters show that accumulating experience cannot replace a 
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dedicated effort to learn from integration experience.  Even if a 
company is not a serial acquirer, it can still document its 
knowledge and make full use of it when another acquisition comes 
along.  At SC Johnson, since a large acquisition occurs only 
every two or three years, there is no permanent M&A integration 
team.  When corporate needs to mobilize many resources for a 
large acquisition, it pulls together a sizable integration team 
specific to the acquisition.   Nevertheless, Lee McCullum, 
Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, emphasized 
that the integration team is called together after the 
announcement to review the documentation from four of SC 
Johnson’s major acquisitions and ensure that they understand the 
learnings that have been captured.  Over the past 15 years, the 
company has carefully documented the results and lessons from its 
M&A integrations, and benefits from its own knowledge to improve 
its acquisition integrations. Raising the odds of success 
substantially, these efforts have proved worthwhile for SC 
Johnson as well as for our other master acquirers. 
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SIDEBAR 1 Research Design and Methodology 
 
In 2006, The Conference Board launched a two-stage research 
project on M&A integration practices among master acquirers. The 
project was composed of two types of research:  first, an 
investigation through questionnaires, and second, interviews with 
integration specialists at experienced acquirers. The project 
aimed to answer the following questions: Which M&A integration 
practices do master acquirers (and occasional) use most? How do 
master (and occasional) acquirers rate the effectiveness of their 
M&A integration practices? Which M&A integration practices do 
master (and occasional) acquirers rate as most effective? Do 
master outperform occasional acquirers in their M&A integrations?  
 
Survey 
A list of 23 M&A integration practices was drawn up from past 
research and confirmed in discussions with consultants. This list 
was included in the questionnaire, in the terms used by 
acquisition specialists.  
 
In 2006, 400 surveys were sent worldwide to members of The 
Conference Board’s* merger and acquisition, business development 
and corporate strategy membership networks.  Of these, 101 
surveys were received for a response rate slightly over 25 
percent. The 101 respondent firms were engaged in 2,447 
integrations over the past decade. For some figures, we used a 
subset of 75 respondents due to missing data. Of the 75, 27 did 
not or only slightly view mergers and acquisitions as a key 
growth instrument; we call these 'occasional acquirers'. The 
remaining 48 firms all to a good or great extent relied on M&A as 
a key growth instrument; those we call 'master acquirers'. 
 
Of the respondents, 65 percent are headquartered in North 
America; 35 percent in Europe. The sample consists of many large 
companies:  59 percent had sales over $ 5 billion. Respondent 
companies were widely distributed across industry sectors: 43 
percent from manufacturing; 29 percent from services; 12 percent 
from financial services; and 11 percent from energy and utilities 
among others.  
 
Interviews  
In addition, we interviewed 12 merger and acquisition integration 
directors from different firms. While some of these firms proved 
very successful in their acquisitions, some were consistently 
less successful. Doing this allowed us to compare practices 
between successful and less successful firms. In particular, the 
in-depth interviews provided deep insight into how firms differ 
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in the use of M&A integration practices. More importantly, it led 
to four important lessons derived from firms renowned for their 
repeated success in M&A integrations.  From these interviews, 
IBM, Home Depot, Dow Chemical, Xerox, and GE Commercial Finance 
provided the examples cited in this article. 
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Table 1 Description of Categories of M&A Integration Practices 
 
 
 
I n t  e r  n a  l  a  n d  
e x t  e r  n a  l  f u n c t  i o n s   
a  n d  s t  a f f i n g 
Q u a  n t  i t  a  t  i v e  m o d els
T o o l s 
D o c u m e n t  s   a  n d  
m a  n u a  l s 
M & A  p  r  a  c  t  i  c  e  s  
P  e  r  s  o  n  n  e  l   f u  n  c  t  i  o  n  s   i  n   a  n  d   o  u  t  s  i  d  e   t  h  e   o  r g  a  n  i  z  a  t  i  o  n    
t  h  a  t   m  a  n  a  g  e   t  h  e   v  a  r  i  o  u  s   M & A   i  n  t  e  g  r  a  t  i  o  n    p  h  a  s  e  s   b  y    
p  r  o  v  i  d  i  n  g    M & A   e  x  p  e  r  t  i  s  e  
P  a  c  k  a  g  e  s   a  n  d   m  o  d  e  l  s   t  o   a  l  l  o  w    f o  r    c  o  m  p  a  r i  s  o  n    
b  e  t  w  e  e  n    a  c  q u  i  r  e  r    a  n  d    a  c  q  u  i  r  e  e  a  n  d    c  a  r  e  f u  l   
m  a  n  a  g  e  m  e  n  t  o  f   i  n  t  e  g  r  a  t  i  o  n    p  r  o  c  e  s  s  
D  e  s  c  r  i  p  t  i  o  n  
I n  s  t  r  u  m  e  n  t  s   a  n  d   a  l  g  o  r  i  t  h  m  s   t  h  a  t   h  e  l  p    m  a  n  a  g  e   M & A   
i  n  t  e  g  r  a  t  i  o  n    t h  r  o  u  g  h    p  r  o  v  i  s  i  o  n    o  f  g  u  i  d  e  l  i  n  e  s   a  n  d   
d  e  l  i  b  e  r  a  t  e    s  h  a  r  i  n  g    o  f  e  x  p  e  r  i  e  n  c  e  
C o  d  i  f i  e  d    m  a  t e  r  i  a  l   t  o    s  u  p  p  o  r  t   s  p  e  c  i  f i  c    p  a  r t  s   o  f   t  h  e   
M & A   i  n  t  e  g  r  a  t  i  o  n    p  r  o  c  e  s  s   t  o    n  u  r  t  u  r  e    c  o  n  s  i  s  t  e  n  c  y    a  n  d    
p  r  o  f e  s  s  i  o  n  a  l  i  s  m   t  h  r  o  u  g  h  o  u  t   t  h  e   i  n  t  e  g  r  a  t  i  o  n    p  r  o  c  e  s  s  
S  o u r c e :   P a r t i a l l y   b a s e d   o n   Z o l l o a n d   S  i n g h   ( 20 04 ).  
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Table 2 Use of M&A Integration Practices 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. Internal and external
functions and staffing
External lawyers and financial experts 89.1 %
Internal M&A department 75.2 %
Internal on-going M&A team 66.3 %
External consultants 55.4 %
IV. Documents & manuals
Due diligence checklist 98.0 %
HR integration manual 65.3 %
Due diligence manual 55.4 %
Systems conversion manual 55.4 %
Product training manual 52.5 %
System training manual 51.5 %
Affiliation/integration manual 48.5 %
III. Tools
Joint planning sessions 80.2 %
Formal sessions between managers involved in
M&A integration 76.2 %
Standards target selection approach 71.3 %
Use of performance metrics 68.3 %
Systematic integration evaluation 59.4 %
Acquisition integration database 56.4 %
M&A integration trainings 46.5 %
II. Quantitative models
Financial evaluation 93.1 %
Project management 71.3 %
Staffing models 57.4 %
Product mapping 54.5 %
Self-training packages 51.5 %
N=101
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Table 3 Use of M&A Integration Practices Comparing Master and 
Occasional Acquirers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N=48 Master  a cqu irer s
Figures in  percentages
In te rn a l a n d e xte rn a l fu n ction s  
an d s taffin g Qu an titative  m o de ls
Too ls
Financia l eva lua t ion
Product  mapping
Self-t ra in ing packages
Project  management
J oin t  business plann ing
Formal session s between managers involved in  M&A in tegra t ion
M&A in tegra t ion  t r a in ing
Docu m e n ts /m an u als
Due diligence checklist
Due diligence manua l
Affilia t ion /in tegra t ion  manual
Systems t ra in ing manua l
In terna l M&A depar tmen t
Externa l consu lt an ts
N=27 Occasional acqu irer s
93.8
79.2
70.8
54.2
88.9
70.4
55.6
59 .3
Externa l lawyers and financia l exper t s
In ternal on -going M&A in tegra t ion  team
97.7
79 .2
56.3
52 .2
50
85.2
55.6
51.9
40.7
48.1
Staffing models
Standard ta rget  select ion  approach
Use of per formance metr ics
Systemat ic M&A in tegra t ion  eva lua t ion
Acquisit ion  in tegra t ion  da tabase
83.3
79 .2
77.1
70.8
60 .4
58.3
43 .8
74.1
66 .7
66 .7
59 .3
48.1
48.1
44 .4
HR in tegra t ion  manua l
Systems conver sion  manua l
Product  t r a in ing manual 
100
60.4
58.3
58.3
50
43.8
37.5
92.6
59.3
48.1
51.9
40.7
55.6
51.9
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Table 4 Effectiveness of M&A Practices Comparing Master and Occasional 
Acquirers 
 
 
 
N=48 Master  a cqu irer s
Figures in  percen tages
In te rn a l a n d e xte rn al fu n ction s  
an d s ta ffin g Qu an tita tive  m ode ls
Tools
Financia l eva lua t ion
Product  mapping
Self-t ra in ing packages
Project  management
J oin t  business plann ing
Formal session s between  managers involved in  M&A in tegra t ion
M&A in tegra t ion  t ra in ing
Docu m e n ts /m an u a ls
Due diligence checklist
Due diligence manual
Affilia t ion /in tegra t ion  manua l
Systems t ra in ing manual
In terna l M&A depar tmen t
External consu ltan ts
N=27 Occasiona l acqu irer s
Externa l lawyers and financia l exper ts
In terna l on-going M&A in tegra t ion  team Staffing models
Standard ta rget  select ion  approach
Use of performance met r ics
Systemat ic M&A in tegra t ion  eva luat ion
Acquisit ion  in tegra t ion  da tabase
HR in tegra t ion  manual
Systems conversion  manua l
Product  t ra in ing manua l 
3.93
4.12
3.97
2.96
3.75
3.73
3.47
3.19
4 .28
3.76
3.7
3.63
3.35
4 .17
3 .75
3.7
3.46
3.27
3 .87
3.77
3 .63
3
3.52
3.82
3.74
3 .65
3.76
3.56
3
3.15
3 .5
3.23
4.27
3.76
3.67
3.59
3.57
3.5
3.45
4
3.31
3.43
3.31
3.92
3.07
3
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Endnote 
 
*The Conference Board is a not-for-profit independent business 
research and membership organization that creates and 
disseminates knowledge about management and the marketplace to 
help businesses strengthen their performance and better serve 
society.  Working as a global, independent membership 
organization in the public interest, it conducts research, 
convenes conferences, makes forecasts, assesses trends, publishes 
information and analysis, and brings executives together to learn 
from one another. 
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